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STUDENT Noa'Ts
In the case of Shaver v. Weddington, et al., 247 Ky. 248 (1932)
the will provided: "Then I request that she divide any earnings
she and I have accumulated during our marriage between her people
and mine, either by gift or by will as she may deem proper". The
court said in construing this passage, "We have a line of cases holding
that, where property has been devised absolutely, any limitation sought
to be imposed upon its disposition or provision repugnant to the fee,
will be .construed as void." This seems to be absolutely binding and
should have formed the basis of a, different result in the Williams case.
An exceedingly well written opinion and one which reviews most
of the former cases is Wells v. Jewell, 232 Ky. 92, where the devisee
is given unlimited power to dispose of property, it is generally placed
in this class as being a devise in fee.
Consequently, from the above statements, it is almost impossible
to see wherein the court found sufficient ground upon which to base the
decision of the Williams case.
H. W. VINcENT.
CRImINAL LW-RiGnT TO WAIvE Juit
OF THE STATE's ATTomY.

TRIAL OVER THE OBJCTIO

In the recent case of The People v. Scornavache, 347 Ill. 403, 179
N. B. 909 (1931) the defendant pleaded not guilty to an indictment for
murder and moved for a trial without a jury. The state's attorney
objected to this motion and moved that the cause be tried.by a jury.
The court sustained the latter motion. Upon being convicted, the defendant appealed and claimed that.the court erred in refusing to hear
the case without a jury. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the
decision of the lower court and thereby refused to allow the accused
to waive his constitutional right of trial by jury.
There are three very important problems raised by the case. (1)
What is the effect of the motion by the accused to waive his right of
trial by jury? (2) Must the state's attorney always agree that the
jury be waived? (3) May the court use its own discretion in allowing
the jury to be waived in criminal cases? These questions are discussed in the light of legislative silence and under a constitution
which contains the usual wording that "The right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate".
It has become well established by a long line of decisions that
the constitutional guarantee of the right of trial by jury may be
waived by the accused at his election. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 1
Melcalf (Ky.) 365 (1858); State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349 (1878);
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 74 L. Ed. 855 (1929); People v.
Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930). In all of these cases there
was either an agreement between the accused and the prosecuting attorney to waive the jury or a statute allowing the same. The Scornavache case was decided on the theory that the right to waive a trial
K. L.
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by jury does not carry with it the right to demand the trial of a
criminal case by the court. The emphasis in this instance should be
placed on the distinction between the two phrases "right to waive"
and "right to demand". On this point the case is sound and is supported by the following decisions: State v. Meade, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 309
(1837); Ickes v. State, 63 Ohio St. 549, 59 N. E. 233 (1900); Morrison
v. State, 31 Okla. Crim. Rep. 11, 236 Pac. 901 (1925); Patton v. United
States, supra. Some writers contend that this doctrine is contrary to
the idea that the right to a jury trial is a private right which the
accused may forego at his election. 25 Michigan Law Review 695; 79
A. L. R. 553; 21 Kentucky Law Journal 1. But this contention is unsound in view of the distinction that was made above. It must be
borne in mind that the state's attorney in objecting to a motion to
waive the jury is not necessarily objecting on the grounds that the
state has a right involved, but on the grounds that the accused cannot show a constitutional or statutory right to demand a trial by the
court.
This apparent inconsistency is best explained by observing an
analogy. In the case of Edwards v. State, 45 N. J. L. 419, the court
held that the accused could waive the right to be first indicted by a
grand jury. Would it be argued for a moment that by virtue of this
decision the accused could demand that the indictment before a grand
jury be dispensed with? This is virtually the situation in the Scornavache case.
Many states have passed statutes to take care of the problem involved here. They may be grouped as follows: (1) Statutes requiring
an agreement between the accused, the state's attorney and the court.
Indiana is a very good example of this. Burns, Ann. Stat., 1926, Sec.
2299. (2) In New Jersey the granting of the request to waive the
jury is wholly within the discretion of the court. 2 Comp. Stat. p.
1824. (3) Only the consent of the accused is required in many states.
Laws of Wisconsin, 1925, Chapter 124. The legislature in enacting
any one of the various types of statutes is merely determining a question of public policy. Under the typical provision of the various state
constitutions on the jury trial, all the different kinds of statutes referred to above have been upheld. State v. Edwards, supra; Murphy
v. State, 97 Ind. 579 (1884); State v. Worden, supra.
Under the present condition in Kentucky the problem raised by
the principle case could only arise in cases involving misdemeanors.
Kentucky Statute 2252 allows the accused to waive the jury in"misdemeanor cases but prohibits such a prodedure in trials of persons
charged with felonies. Therefore, all felony cases in Kentucky must
be tried by a jury as long as the above statute is in force. Branham
v. Commonwea7th, 209 Ky. 734, 273 S. W. 489 (1924). If the Kentucky
Court follows the majority rule on the question of the right to waive
the jury where there is statutory sanction for such a procedure, it
would hold in misdemeanor cases that a motion to waive the jury
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trial would be obligatory upon the court. However, this question of
the effect of the statute has never been before the court as the desire
to waive the jury has always been mutual between the parties until
the accused found that the judge had decided for the state.
In the absence of statute it must be concluded that the effect of
the motion by the defendant to waive the jury is to place the burden
upon the court to determine the expediency of such a procedure.
However, no case has been found holding that the defendant is in a
position to demand a trial by the court. Likewise, no case has been
found where the court sustained the defendant's motion for a trial
without a jury over the objection of the state's attorney. The following cases hold that the court is correct in sustaining the objection
to the motion to waive: Morrison v. State, supra; State v. Mead, supra;
Ickes v. State, supra. The cases generally agree that the court has
the final word in determining the right to waive the jury trial in
criminal cases. This is best expressed by the words of Justice Sutherland in the case of Patton v. United States, supra, at p. 312, "The duty
of the trial court in determining a motion of waiver of jury is not
discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departure from
that mode of trial". This in its last analysis means that the judge
must be certain that a trial by the court in the patricular case will
be just as expedient as a jury trial before the older method will be
dispensed with.
H. C. SrrH.
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oF AcTIONS For RECOVERY OF OVERCHARGES

For the past few years the principal railroads of Kentucky have
declined to pay bona fide claims for overcharges on Kentucky intrastate shipments unless such claims are presented within two years
from the date of delivery of the shipments. Formerly these claims
were paid if filed within five years. No recent decision of the courts
or modification of the statutes has been cited in support of this change
of position by the carriers. Numerous complaints have been voiced
by shippers whose claims have been rejected on this ground, but thus
far no action involving this point has been decided by the Court of
Appeals.
As used herein the term "overcharges" is confined to charges in
excess of rates lawfully established and filed with the Railroad Commission as provided by Section 201g-3 of the Kentucky Statutes.
There appears to be no question but that the two year limitation period
provided in Section 819 of the Statutes is applicable to actions brought
under Sections 816 (extortion), 817 (discrimination), 818 (preference),

